A two-period game is developed in a bilateral monopoly where, besides pricing decisions, the retailer and manufacturer can set their advertising and cooperative advertising support rates for each period. It is demonstrated that, in addition to the established continuous cooperative advertising programs, in which the retailer advertises and the manufacturer supports retailer advertising in each period, two other advertising schedules are possible. First, the retailer advertises in each period, while the manufacturer only supports the second-period advertising. Second, whether or not the manufacturer provides a cooperative advertising program in the first period, the retailer only advertises in the second period and receives advertising support. The conditions under which each of these advertising arrangements is implemented are identified. In a continuous cooperative advertising schedule, the manufacturer may change his advertising support over time depending on the nature of the long-term effects of retailer advertising. The implications of these findings are discussed.
|Number of pages||7|
|Journal||Journal of Business Research|
|Publication status||Published - 1 Jan. 2017|
- Cooperative advertising
- Game theory
- Retailer advertising